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This paper is about the last person to be known as a
great Rationalist before Kant’s Transcendental Philoso-
phy forever blurred the distinction between that tra-
dition and that of the Empiricists. Gottfried Wilhelm
von Leibniz is well known both for the Law which
bears his name and states that “if two things are ex-
actly the same, they are not two things, but one” and
for his co-invention of the Differential Calculus. It is
commonly taught that Leibniz and Isaac Newton each
independently discovered means to find:
1) the tangent to a curve at a point.
2) the length of a curve, the area of a region, and the
volume of a solid.
3) the maximum or minimum value of a quantity.
4) the relation between the velocity and acceleration
of a body at an instant and the total distance trav-
eled by that body in a given period of time.1
These new mathematical techniques supplanted those
of the ancients and provided modern scientists with
tools which enabled their science to leapfrog classical
science. Since these discoveries were so important to
the natural sciences and the ensuing technological
development, great prestige came to be attached to
them. Competition for this prestige resulted in a bit-
ter dispute in which Leibniz was charged with pla-
giarism. To chronicle the charges and counter-charges
would be an interesting task--but one better left to
historians of mathematics.
The 17th century was buzzing with discovery and
humming with intellectual activity. Someone would
have discovered the calculus before 1700 if neither
Leibniz nor Newton had been born.2 While it is gen-
erally agreed that their discoveries were independent,
it is known that Newton’s discovery preceded that of
Leibniz. Though Newton was first, that the centuries
have decided in favor of Leibniz’s notation because
of the relative facility of its use, is testimony to the
central position of notation in Leibniz’s thinking. For
him, thinking is the manipulation of the symbols of
notation-facility of manipulation is facility of thought.
Anyone who has tried to calculate simple interest us-
ing Roman Numerals knows well the importance of
an elegant notation.
In the preface to his translations of The Early Math-
ematical Manuscripts of Leibniz, J.M. Child maintains
that “the main ideas of [Leibniz’s] philosophy are to
be attributed to his mathematical work, and not vice
versa.”3 The esteem in which Leibniz held an elegant
notation (the most elegant being the simplest possible
way of handling all the possibilities) is all that is of-
fered in support of this. If, by ‘main ideas’ Child means
the form of Leibniz’s analysis—that is, that part which
has its source in the method which he employs—I
would not disagree. But we must ask more than how
it is that he performs his analysis, we must also ask
what it is that he chooses to analyze. Neither Leibniz’s
interests nor his optimism knew any bounds. We must
remember that in addition to being a great mathema-
tician and logician, he was also the Dr. Pangloss ridi-
culed by Voltaire in Candide. If recursion of notation
is Leibniz’s method, philanthropia is his motivation.
The two are tied together by his views of God and the
philothea appropriate to the wise man.
The function of God in Leibnizian metaphysics is to
be the creator of the universe (the first cause) as well
as the source of perfection and order within it (the
final cause). Hence, God is, by definition, the perfect
creator of the universe. Likewise, by definition, com-
posite substances (bodies) are composed of simple
substances4 and simple substances are unities.5 Leibniz
calls these unified simple substances ‘monads’ after
the Greek monas. Since monads are simple, they have
no parts. Change occurs when parts are combined
together or cleaved apart. “Now where there are no
parts, neither extension, nor figure, nor divisibility is
possible.”6 Thus monads are changeless, eternal, and
by all outer appearances, identical. But the law that
bears Leibniz’s name tells us that they cannot be iden-
tical—for if they were they would be one and the same
thing. The dilemma is solved by letting them differ
internally. These internal differences lie in the differ-
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ent perceptions and appetitions of the different
monads.7 It is assumed that every monad is subject to
change and that change is continuous.8 But these in-
ternal changes “are inexplicable by mechanical causes.”9
Mechanical causes apply only to bodies (composite
substances) “[T]he perceptions in the monad spring
one from the other, by the laws of desires [appetits] or
of the final causes of good and evil, which consist in ob-
servable, regulated or unregulated, perceptions; just
as the changes of bodies and external phenomena
spring one from another, by the laws of efficient causes,
that is, of motions.” He claims that this entails that
“there is a perfect harmony between the perceptions
of the monad and the motions of the bodies, prees-
tablished at the beginning between the system of effi-
cient causes and that of final causes.”10
Surely a perfect creator would create the best possible
product if not a perfect product. The best possible
universe is that in which
“there is the greatest variety
together with the greatest
order;...the most results...;
the most of power, knowl-
edge, happiness and good-
ness in the creatures that the
universe could permit.”11
This universe is a plenum—
that is “nature never makes
leaps”12 —and because of
this “everything is con-
nected and each body acts upon every other body...”13
Bodies are connected together by efficient causes. God,
as the creator of the universe, is the only being with a
complete knowledge of it. That God does have per-
fect knowledge of the universe is required by the prin-
ciple of sufficient reason: “nothing happens without
its being possible for him who should understand
things, to give a reason sufficient to determine why it
so and not otherwise.”14 Other monads perceive the
whole universe with some degree of confusion. Some
of the least confused are aware that they are repre-
senting the perceived objects of the universe to them-
selves. Leibniz anticipates Kant’s Transcendental
Unity of Apperception15 and grants consciousness only
to beings with reflective awareness (that is awareness
of being aware of bodies external to it). This reflec-
tion gives reason access to necessary truths. Leibniz
is here constrained by his criterion of necessity.
Leibnizian necessity is analytic—necessary proposi-
tions are those whose denials are self contradictory.
Section 30 of The Monadology begins: “It is also by the
knowledge of necessary truths and by their abstrac-
tions, that we rise to acts of reflection, which makes
us think of that which calls itself ‘I’, and to observe
that this or that is within us: and it thus implies that
in thinking of ourselves, we think of being, of sub-
stance, simple or composite, of the immaterial and of
God himself...” Perhaps he is suggesting that the mind
concentrates on the subject because the truth value of
a necessary proposition is determined without refer-
ence to an object.
Kant employs a second test of necessity to tell a more
plausible story. If something is universal, that is if it
applies to everything, there is some sense in which it
is necessary.16 Kant notes that “ [i]t must be possible
for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representa-
tions.”17 Though the proposition ‘I think that X is my
representation’ is analytic,
“it reveals the necessity of a
synthesis of the manifold
given in intuition.”18
Descartes never could have
forseen the uses to which
his cogito ergo sum would be
put.
Leibniz calls those monads
that are the souls of the re-
flective animals—those
which are said to be rational—spirits and says that
they have access to “immaterial things and truths.”19
“...As regards the rational soul, or spirit, there is some-
thing in it more than in the other monads, or even in
simple souls. It is not only a mirror of the universe of
creatures, but also an image of the Divinity. The
spirit...imitates, in its department and in its little world,
where it is permitted to exercise itself, what God does
in the large world.”20 Reason is the pathway to the
city of God.
In streamlining notation, Leibniz is making that path-
way more accessible to his fellows. Thus, his life’s goal
to create an ‘alphabet of human thought,’ the sym-
bols of which if “correctly and ingeniously estab-
lished...will be capable of being read without any dic-
tionary” and will provide “a fundamental knowledge
of all things.”21 Leibniz did not finish this project be-
fore his death, but his work was carried on by people
❝...his life’s goal [was] to create an ‘alphabet of
human thought,’ the symbols of which if “cor-
rectly and ingeniously established...will be
capable of being read without any dictionary”
and will provide “a fundamental knowledge of all
things.”
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like Frege and Russell and Whitehead who formal-
ized first order logic. That this is not possible was not
proven until 1931 when Kurt Goedel showed that all
first order systems contain statements that can nei-
ther be proven true nor shown to be false(e.g. “this
sentence is false”). The ‘universal calculus’ is the first
of the two calculi with which Leibniz would preoc-
cupy himself. Another is the differential calculus for
which he and Newton are remembered. That calcu-
lus is far more specific—not covering “the conceptual
atoms from which absolutely all molecular concepts
can be formed,”22 but only the rates of change at an
instant—that is, variation of variation of bodies in
space. We set out to show that Leibniz’s mathematics
and philosophy are not clearly differentiated bodies
of work, but are, respectively, his methods and his
aims.
One approach to this task is to explore the philosophi-
cal pre-suppositions which Leibniz makes when he
chooses to use the mathematical techniques which he
does. Answering this question requires first a detailed
examination of the problems and of Leibniz’s solu-
tions. Most of the English secondary literature on this
topic seems to depend on J.M. Child’s 192023 transla-
tion of the manuscripts “...unearthed by Dr. C.I.
Gerhardt in a mass of papers belonging to Leibniz that
had been preserved in the Royal Library of
Hanover...”24 Child’s work contains both the daily
notes which Leibniz made to himself in late 1675 while
he was in the process of making his discovery and
two later reflections upon that period: the first a post-
script, later cancelled, to a letter written from Berlin
in April of 1703 to James Bernoulli; the second,
Leibniz’s own version of the story to be told to pos-
terity: Historia et Origo Calculi Differentialis which was
“probably finished just before the death of Leibniz...in
November 1716.”25 This last is of the same period as
The Monadology and The Principles of Nature and of Grace
(both 1714) as well as the Metaphysical Foundations of
Mathematics (1715) which also warrants our attention.
Important to the discovery of the infinitesimal calcu-
lus was the friendship which Leibniz made with
Christiaan Huygens shortly upon his arrival in Paris
in 1672. Leibniz looked closely at Euclid’s axiom that
the whole is greater than the part26 and determined
that it was not valid when applied to the angle of con-
tact between a circle arc and its tangent.27 That the
whole seems not to be greater than the part is the re-
sult of a long lived debate over the definition of ‘angle.’
The Ancients did not require that the line segments
which bound an angle be straight. Euclid defines
rectlineal angles as a species of angles in general.28
There was also great uncertainty about into which of
Aristotle’s categories angles should be put. Euclid’s
view was that angles, as magnitudes, belong in the
category of quantity. If angles are magnitudes it must
be possible to relate the quantity of any two angles as
a ratio (e.g. 45 degrees : 90 degrees = 1:2). Assume a
circle centered at (0, -R) tangent to the X axis and nor-
mal to the Y axis at the origin. Construct a secant line
from the origin to (R, -R). Together, with the X axis, it
forms a 45 degree rectilineal angle LR, the magnitude
of which can be compared with that of the curvalineal,
horn-like keratoeides angle LC formed between the X
axis and the circle arc from the origin to (R, -R). If we
successively reduce the length of the secant we reduce
LR by the same ratio. We can form a series of congru-
ent ratios: LR:LC = LR1:LC1 = LRn:LCn where the length of
the secant is 1/n of the original. At the point of tan-
gency, both angles are of zero magnitude and yet ex-
pected to stand in the same constant ratio. Euclid
maintains that all rectilineal angles are greater than
any curvilineal angle (III, 16).29 Thus, the rectilineal
angle is in the contradictory position of having to be
both greater than and equal to the ‘horn-shaped’ angle.
The failure of the axiom to hold for the angle of con-
tact led Leibniz to believe, with Hobbes,30 that it is
not an axiom at all, but a provable theorem.31 From
early childhood Leibniz wanted to allow only defini-
tions and statements of identity to be axiomatic.32 He
reduced Euclid’s axiom to a syllogism containing only
definition and identity:
“Whatever is equal to a part of another, is less than
that other: (by the definition)
But the part is equal to a part of the whole: (i.e., to
itself, by identity)
Hence the part is less than the whole. Q.E.D.”33
Since any part ‘A’ is equal to itself, we can conclude
that A - A = 0. And build from that:
“A - A + B - B + C - C + D - D + E - E = 0
          + L      + M       + N      + P
If now A, B, C, D, E are supposed to be quantities that
continually increase in magnitude, and the differences
Humanistic Mathematics Network Journal #1950
between successive terms are denoted by L, M, N, P,
it will then follow that
A + L + M + N + P - E = 0
i. e. L + M + N + P = E - A
that is, the sums of the differences between succes-
sive terms, no matter how great their number, will be
equal to the difference between the terms at the be-
ginning and the end of the series.” Leibniz went on to
take the second differences—that is the differences of
the differences—and the third. Once he got going this
way, it was not possible to avoid discovering “that
the differences of the powers of the natural numbers,
when taken continuously, finally vanished.”34
Leibniz went to Huygens with the news of his dis-
covery of a general method for summing infinite se-
ries. Huygens was interested and suggested both a
problem which he had considered earlier as a test ex-
ercise as well as some readings in the relevant litera-
ture.35 Thus began the relationship to which Leibniz
says he owes his “introduction to higher mathemat-
ics.”36 Huygens lead Leibniz to Gregoire’s Opus
geometricum which considers geometrical representa-
tions of sums of series.37 Leibniz met other mathema-
ticians in his travels. It was in London where he met
John Pell who told him that Nicolaus Mercator had
already documented the discovery of the vanishing
differences of powers.38 Leibniz’s work in the sum-
ming of difference series led to the conception of the
‘harmonic triangle’ “in which the oblique rows are
successive difference sequences, so that their sums can
be easily read off from the scheme.”39 This represen-
tation made obvious the mutually inverse relation
between difference sequences and sum sequences.
This became quite significant when Leibniz applied a
similar scheme to geometry and discovered that “the
determinations of quadratures and tangents are also
mutually inverse operations.”40 The area under a curve
which crosses above the X axis at the origin can be
approximated by inscribing rectangles and then tak-
ing the summation of their areas. If we assume the
rectangles to be of width 1, the area under the curve
is approximately equal to the sum of the Y values.
Leibniz realized that if the rectangles became infinitely
narrow, the approximations would become exact.41
While the rectangles still have width, atop of each is a
right triangle—the hypotenuse of which is a section
of the circle arc. Blaise Pascal had noticed that these
triangles are nearly “similar to the triangles formed
by ordinate, tangent and subtangent, or ordinate, nor-
mal and sub-normal”42 when proving “the theorem
of Archimedes for measuring the surface of a
sphere.”43 From this Leibniz was able to develop a
general theorem for determining “the whole moment
of the curve.”44 Leibniz spent the better part of two
years “finding, analytically (that is, by manipulation
of formulas) all sorts of relations between quadra-
tures.”45 One such relation was that “the moments of
the differences about a straight line perpendicular to
the axis are equal to the complement of the sum of
the terms, and the moments of the terms are equal to
the complement of the sum of the sums.”46 Leibniz
first expressed this relation in a notation borrowed
from Bonaventura Cavalieri.47 For example: “omn.xl
= x omn.l - omn.omn.l, where l is taken to be a term of
a progression, and x is the number which expresses
the position or order of the l corresponding to it; or x
is the ordinal number and l is the ordered thing.”48
(“‘Omn.’ is the abbreviation of ‘omnes linae’, ‘all
lines.’”)49 Utility rather than necessity was the mother
of the invention of the integral notation of the calcu-
lus: “It will be useful to write ∫ for omn., so that ∫l =
omn.l, or the sum of the l’s. Thus.... ∫(xl) = x∫(l) - ∫∫l is
equivalent to the ‘omn.xl = x omn.l - omn.omn.l’ of
the above example.50
This elegant, economical notation freed Leibniz to
easily develop an elaborate scheme of analytic truths.
Elaborate as this scheme is and though it is “correctly
and ingeniously established” it is not an ‘alphabet of
human thought’ and it certainly does not provide “a
fundamental knowledge of all things.”51 That Leibniz
was able to dig as far as he did into the foundation of
analytic thought is amazing. I can’t help but believe
in his belief that:
[E]verything in the whole wide world pro-
ceeds mathematically, that is infallibly, so that
if one had enough insight into the inner parts
of things and also enough memory and un-
derstanding to take in all the circumstances
and calculate them, he would be a prophet; he
would see the future in the present as in a mir-
ror.52
This gave him the zeal to proceed with his analysis.
Though this belief relates mathematics with the world,
it is a philosophical belief—not a mathematical one. In
this sense it is not unlike the question of the ontologi-
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cal status of the infinitesimal — a philosophical ques-
tion about a mathematical method. It is for this rea-
son that I disagree with Child when he maintains that
“the main ideas of [Leibniz’s] philosophy are to be
attributed to his mathematical work, and not vice
versa.”53 For Leibniz, mathematics and philosophy are
inexorably intertwined.
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